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ABSTRACT

Karen Leigh Matsinger
SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS EFFECTS ON JURY DECISIONS
2007/08
Dr. Eleanor Gaer
Master of Mental Health Counseling and Applied Psychology

This study compares the effect of reasonable standards on the jury's verdict in a
sexual harassment lawsuit. One hundred and fifty seven participants (82 males, 74
females and 1 unidentified), ages ranging from 16 to 90, (M= 22.74) were randomly
divided into juries (7 reasonable woman, 8 reasonable person, and 9 reasonable worker).
Participants wetre given a written sexual harassment case, judge's instructions, and a
survey to complete before and after the group had reached a unanimous verdict.
It was hypothesized that participants who applied the reasonable woman standard
would be riore likely to take the complainant's perspective. This hypothesis was found to
be supported by a significant difference between worker and woman juries' use of the
terms of hostile work environment. There were significant interactions between those
who did and did not experience sexual harassment in the workplace and their judgments
of both, hostile work environment and severity.
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CHAPTER I
Literature Review
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in order to prohibit a broad range of
employment discrimination; including discrimination based on an individual's gender. In
1972, congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and passed the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, giving the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission power to enforce Title VII. A growing number of plaintiffs originally made
efforts to bring sexual harassment claims to the attention of the courts under Title VII.
These claims initially failed because courts construed the events as interpersonal conflicts
or normal interaction between sexes, rather than gender-based discrimination barred by
Title VII (e.g., Barnes v. Train, 1974; Comrne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 1975; Barnes v.
Costle, 1977).
Although courts did not initially recognize sexual harassment as a valid or
genuine claim under this Act, sexual harassment began to emerge as a valid cause of
action in 1976. This was the year a lower court in Washington, D.C. recognized quid pro
quo sexual harassment as discrimination in Williams v. Saxbe (1976). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission published guidelines in 1980 that provided a
framework for this new claim, and the Supreme Court adopted it. The guidelines
identified quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment and the Supreme
Court later adopted this distinction (Epstein, 2004)...

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1994) defines "Quid pro quo"
to be conditions in which an employee has rejected an employer's sexual advances and
the supervisor has taken adverse, tangible, retaliatory action against the employee. A
prima facie case (meaning "on its first appearance", or "by first instance" used in common
law jurisdictions to denote evidence that is sufficient, if not rebutted, to prove a particular
proposition or fact) for quid pro quo harassment is established if the employee shows that
(1) he/she was a victim of a pattern or practice of sexual harassment attributable to their
employer; and (2) the plaintiff applied for and was denied an employment benefit for
which they were technically eligible, and for which they had a reasonable expectation
(Bundy v. Jackson, 1981).
Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines (1990), an
employer is always responsible for harassment by a supervisor that culminated in a
tangible employment action. If the harassment did not lead to a tangible employment
action, the employer is liable unless he or she proves that: 1) they exercised reasonable
care to prevent and promptly correct any harassment; and 2) the employee unreasonably
failed to complain to management or to avoid harm otherwise. U.S. Circuit Courts have
issued contradictory opinions about what constitutes a "tangible employment action"
(Parkinsv. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc, 1998; Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr.,
Inc, 1998).
Foote & Goodman-Delahunty (1999) reported that the legal fundamentals and
policy of a hostile workplace environment claim differ from those of a quid pro quo claim
in that workers, subordinates, or supervisors can create a hostile workplace atmosphere
without any threat of the loss of tangible job benefits, if the harassing behavior

unreasonably changes the employee's working conditions and creates an abusive
workplace environment.
According to Koen (1989), MeritorSavings Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986) was the
first Supreme Court case to recognize a hostile environment claim, and it significantly
changed the landscape of this field of law. The Court explained that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission had interpreted Title VII to afford "employees the
right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult," therefore a lack of tangible employment action should not necessary doom a
plaintiffs sexual harassment claim (Koen, 1989. p. 294).
Events that led to the Meritor case are described by Waller (2007) who describes
the case of a female bank teller named, Ms. Vinson, who was hired at Meritor Savings
Bank by Sidney Taylor. Taylor was her immediate supervisor for the next four years.
Vinson testified that Taylor was at first a "fatherly figure" but that he eventually asked
her to dinner, where he suggested that they go to a motel in order to have sex. Vinson
consented, she said, out of fear that she would lose her job. She continued to have sex
with him over the course of two years, and said that on several occasions he forcibly
raped her. Taylor denied ever having had sex with Vinson.
Vinson was promoted several times during the years she worked at Meritor, but
she was fired in 1978 after a series of disputes with Taylor (though the reason for her
firing is not specified in the judicial opinion). She had never filed a complaint with the
bank concerning Taylor's behavior. The court found that the sexual relationship between
Vinson and Taylor was voluntary and that the bank had no responsibility for Taylor's
behavior since it did not know about it. It also held that she had not suffered any

economic harm, noting that her promotions had not been based upon her participation in
the relationship (Waller, 2007).
The appeals court remanded the case, saying that the district court had mistakenly
treated the case as a quid pro quo complaint rather than a hostile environment complaint.
It also held that the district court should not have relied on testimony about Vinson's
dress or personal fantasies in deciding the relationship as voluntary, and that an employer
is responsible for the behavior of its supervisory personnel whether it knows about it or
not.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Vinson's participation in
the sexual relationship was voluntary, and held that testimony about her speech or dress
was admittable in making that determination. However, it agreed with the appeals court
that economic damage is not required for a hostile environment compliant (Meritor
savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson et al, 1996). The Meritor court's definition of welcomeness
(not necessarily implied, it said, in Vinson's voluntary relationship) is now a foundation
of sexual harassment case law. In Meritor, the court adopted language written by the
Eleventh Circuit Court in Henson v. Dundee (1982):
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986), the court decided that
sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive
environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a
man or women run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be

demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
(Henson v. Dundee, 1982, p. A 24-25).
Since the court's ruling n Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson (1986), employees
claiming hostile work environment in sexual harassment must demonstrate that the
treatment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment (Henson v. Dundee, 1982, p. A 24-25)."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex Regulations consider this kind of harassment to consist of "unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature ... has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, p. 1604.11; A3)."
Other courts erroneously transposed an intentional component into a requirement
that the harasser engage in the conduct at issue because of sexual intent, in part relying on
language in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on sexual
harassment that the conduct be sexual in nature (e.g., King v. Hillen, 1994). Gradually,
the element that the harassing conduct must be sexual in nature was broadened to include
unfulfilled threats to force a sexual quid pro quo, discussing sexual activities, telling offcolor jokes, unnecessary touching, remarking on physical traits, displaying sexually
suggestive material, using demeaning or inappropriate vocabulary, using indecent
gestures, sabotaging the victim's work, engaging in hostile physical conduct, granting job
favors to those who take part in consensual sexual activity, using crude and offensive
language (Foote, 2004, p. 19-2 1). For example, courts held that intimidation and hostility
toward women because they are women can result from conduct other than explicit sexual

advances (e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 1990; Hall v. Gus Construction
Company, 1988).
Ranney (1997) recounts the events that lead to the lawsuit filed on behalf of a
female worker who alleged abusive work environment because of gender against her
former employer, Forklift Systems, Inc. On November 9, 1993, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided the case, Harrisv. ForkliftSystems, Inc. The Federal District Court
was held to have applied incorrect standards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964
in rejecting a female worker's claim alleging abusive work environment because of
gender. Harris sued her former employer, respondent Forklift Systems, Inc., claiming that
the conduct of Forklift's president toward her constituted abusive work environment
harassment because of her gender in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Declaring this is a closed case, the District Court found that among other things,
Forklift's president often insulted Harris because of her gender and often made her the
target of unwanted sexual innuendos.
The court concluded that the comments in question did not create an abusive
environment because they were not "so severe as to ... seriously affect Harris'

psychological well-being or lead her to suffer injury." (Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., p.
A34-35) The Court of Appeals affirmed. Harris was one of only two female managers at
Forklift Systems. The other female manager was the daughter of the company president,
Charles Hardy, who was also the man Harris accused of harassment. Hardy, whom the
district court's report characterized as a vulgar man, had a habit of asking female
employees to retrieve coins from his front pants pockets or to pick up objects he tossed on
the floor before him while he commented on their clothing. He occasionally suggested to
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Harris, in the presence of other employees, that she clinched contracts with customers by
sexual means. When she finally complained about his behavior, he expressed surprise and
promised to modify it but soon reverted to his prior manner. Harris finally resigned her
position with Forklift. The initial mediator's report in this case, which was adopted by
both the trial and appeals courts, found that the other female employees did not object to
what it called the joking work environment at Forklift and concluded that Harris's status
as a manager made her more sensitive to Hardy's behavior than the female clerical
employees. Harris lost her claim at both the trial and appeals levels (Ranney, 1997).
According to Wall (2000), the Supreme Court reviewed Harris's case solely to
determine whether the "Rabidue standard of harm was required to prevail in a sexual
harassment suit was appropriate," (Wall, 2000, p.243) which means the reaction of a
reasonable person in essentially similar circumstances was required to prevail in a sexual
harassment suit (Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 1986). It concluded that a plaintiff may
prevail in a suit "before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown" (Wall,
2000, p. 243). One Supreme Court judge wrote in deciding this case that determining
whether an environment is hostile is an ambiguous endeavor, and proposed an objective
standard testing whether the plaintiffs work performance had suffered. Another judge
added a concurring opinion, specifying that a plaintiff need show not that tangible
productivity has been affected by harassing behavior but that harassment had made it
more difficult to do the job.
In the case of Harrisv. Fork!lift Sys., Inc. (1993), the Supreme Court considered
whether a plaintiff was required to prove psychological injury in order to prevail on a
cause of action alleging hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§

2000e et seq. A unanimous Court

held that if a workplace is permeated with behavior that is severe or pervasive enough to
create a discriminatorily hostile or abusive working environment, Title VII is violated
regardless of whether the plaintiff suffered psychological harm. The Court's decision
reaffirms Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), and is consistent with existing Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission policy on hostile environment harassment.
Consequently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is continuing to conduct
investigations in hostile environment harassment cases in the same manner as it has
previously (Wall, 2000).
The Court in Harris adopted the totality of the circumstances approach which the
Commission had previously set forth in its "Guidelines on Discrimination Because Of
Sex" and in its Policy Guidance "Current Issues of Sexual Harassment." Thus, in
evaluating "welcomeness" and whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
constitute a violation, investigators should continue to "look at the record as a whole and
at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred (Pace, 2002, p.8)." The Court also noted
that the factors that indicate a hostile or abusive environment may include the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. The factors cited by the Court corresponds those detailed in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's Policy Guidance "Current Issues of Sexual
Harassment." Moreover, both the Court and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission have stressed that an employee is not required to show any single factor in

order to succeed on a hostile environment cause of action (Harris, v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., 1993).
The Court's rejection of the psychological injury requirement was also consistent
with the Equal Employment's Opportunity Commission's Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment (1990). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
explicitly rejected the notion that in order to prove a violation, the plaintiff must prove
not only that a reasonable person would find the conduct sufficiently offensive to create a
hostile work environment, but also that plaintiffs psychological well-being was affected.
While investigators may consider psychological injury as a factor in assessing whether a
hostile environment has been created, they should keep in mind that neither this nor any
other single factor is required to state a cause of action for hostile environment
harassment (EEOC; Policy Guidance on Current issues of Sexual harassment, 1990).
The Court in Harrisused the reasonable person standard for assessing hostile
environment claims. Previously, in its Policy Guidance on "Current Issues of Sexual
Harassment," the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1990) had adopted a
reasonable person standard: "determining whether harassment is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile environment, the harasser's conduct should be evaluated from
the objective standpoint of a 'reasonable person (Rabidue, 1988, p. 424)."
Adler and Peirce (1993) reported that in defining the hypothetical reasonable
person, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has emphasized that "the
reasonable person standard should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped
ideas of acceptable behavior (Rabidue, 1988, p. 430)." In Harris, the Court did not
elaborate on the definition of reasonable person. The Court's decision was consistent with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's view that a reasonable person is one
with the perspective of the victim. As a result, investigators should continue to consider
whether a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances would have found the alleged
behavior to be hostile or abusive.
One significant problem with the "reasonable person standard is that it does not
take into account the differences between how men and women experience sexual
behavior (Ellison v. Brady, 1991, p. 19)." Conduct that may offend a woman may not
offend a man, possibly because women are more susceptible to violence such as sexual
assault and rape. In other words, men and women may be inherently differently situated
with regard to sexual harassment (Adler & Peirce, 1993).
Review of the objective reasonableness standard in Title VII sexual harassment
cases examines policies or goals that underlie subjective and objective aspects of the test
to determine whether harassing conduct is sufficiently abusive and hostile to violate the
law; (a) elimination of gender bias norms, (b) eradication of harassment, and (c)
uniformity. Four formulations of objective reasonableness are distinguished: the
reasonable person, victim, women, and employee (Foote and Goodman-Delahunty, 1999).
Johnson (1993) suggests that the following cases would not have differed in
outcome had the reasonable person standard been applied.
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. (1991)
Ellison v. Brady (1991 )
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico (1988)
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia (1990)
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Spencer v. General Electric Co. (1988)
Bumrns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc. (1993)
Lester (1993) suggests that the following cases would have differed had the
reasonable women standard instead of the reasonable person standard been applied.
Fair v. Guiding Eyes for the Blind (1990)
Jones v. Flagship International, Inc., (1986)
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, (1988)
Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (1986)
Hoffman (2004) argues the point that different groups of women who work for the
same company could be treated differently by the males with whom they work. Hoffman
calls this selective sexual harassment, and makes the argument that different women can
be viewed as reasonable based on their given label (based on the males' perception of the
females' sexual orientation) by the male coworkers. Hoffman undertook a case study of
two women who worked for a cab company (one was heterosexual and the other was a
lesbian), which suggests that women who openly admit to being lesbians are not
subjected to the same environment as heterosexual women. Therefore, no harassed
workers could be called on by employers to demonstrate that they, as reasonable women,
did not experience a hostile environment, thus questioning whether the plaintiffs qualify
as reasonable women with worthy grievances.
According to Rubin (1995), sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct that enters into
employment decisions and/or conduct that unreasonably interferes with an individual's
work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
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In hostile work environment complaints, the work environment must become so offensive
as to adversely affect an employee's job performance.
A hallmark of a sexual harassment claim is that the advances are unwelcome.
Unwelcome means that the person did not invite or solicit the advances. This is
determined by an objective standard and not the claimant's subjective feelings. On the
other hand, even voluntary participation in sexual activity does not mean that the
advances were not unwelcome. One factor to consider is whether the person indicated
that the advances were unwelcome notwithstanding consent.
Hostile work environment amounts to unlawful sex discrimination even in the
absence of the loss of a job benefit. Hostile work environment harassment does not
require an impact on an economic benefit. It can involve coworkers, third parties, or
supervisors. It is not limited to sexual advances; it can include hostile or offensive
behavior based on the person's sex. It can occur even when the conduct is not directed at
the claimant but still impacts on his or her ability to perform the job. It typically involves
a series of incidents rather than one incident although a single offensive incident may
constitute a hostile work environment (Rubin 1995).
Petrocelli and Repa (1999) argue that three criteria must be met in a claim of
harassment based on a hostile work environment for the plaintiff to prevail. The conduct
of the defendant was unwelcome. The conduct of the defendant was severe, pervasive,
and regarded by the claimant as so hostile or offensive as to alter his or her conditions of
employment. The conduct of the defendant was such that a reasonable person (other
reasonable terms where later applied, such as women, worker, victim) would find it
hostile or offensive.
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To decide on plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment, the trier-of-fact (judge or
jury) must decide three issues. First the trier-of-fact must determine whether the plaintiff
has proved by a preponderance of the evidence (more than 50% in the plaintiffs favor)
that the alleged conduct actually occurred. Second, the trier-of-fact must find that some or
all of the alleged conduct occurred and must decide whether the plaintiff has proved by a
preponderance of the evidence (more than 50% in the plaintiffs favor) that the conduct
constitutes sexual harassment. This requires that the trier-of-fact decide whether the
conduct occurred because of plaintiffs sex, and if so, whether the conduct was severe or
pervasive enough to make a reasonable person (worker or woman) believe that the
conditions of employment were altered and the working environment was intimidating,
hostile or abusive.
According to Foote & Goodman-Delahunty (2005), in deciding whether the
conduct of a defendant is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile working
environment, the trier-of-fact must view the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable
person (worker or woman), not from the plaintiffs own subjective perspective. In other
words, the issue that must be decided is not whether the plaintiff personally believed that
their working environment was hostile. The issue that must be decided is whether a
reasonable person (worker or woman) would find the working environment hostile. Thus,
if only an overly-sensitive person would view the conduct as sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile working environment, but a reasonable person (woman or
worker) would not, it is not harassing conduct for which the plaintiff can recover. By the
same token, even if the plaintiff personally did not find the alleged conduct to be severe
or pervasive, but a reasonable person (worker or woman) would, it is harassing conduct

13

for which the plaintiff can recover. The trier-of-fact must use their own judgment in
deciding whether a reasonable person (worker or women) would consider the working
environment hostile.
According to Foote & Goodman-Delahunty (2005), the objective
reasonable person standard is intended to safeguard employers
against claims by hypersensitive individuals and against claims
based on petty slights. In other words, a subjective perception
that the workplace is hostile is inadequate; only behavior
so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment constitutes prohibited harassment.
A hypersensitive or idiosyncratic employee will not state a
cause of action unless the complained of conduct, objectively
viewed, is harassing. (p.58-5 9 )
Strong arguments can be made for the support or rejection of a reasonable woman
standard. While not categorically arguing for such a standard, Baird, et al. (1995) pointed
out that since, over-all, women rated scenarios in the work environment as more
harassing than men (and both men and women viewed behavior by a male perpetrator as
more likely to qualify as harassment), it may be unfair to use a reasonable person
standard, an average of men's and women's interpretations of harassment. Researchers
have tempered the interpretation of their findings by calling affention to claiming that
such a standard is ambiguous and vague and that it singles out women for special
treatment (Baird et al., 1995).
Perry, Kulik, & Bourhis, (2004) hypothesized that when other variables (e.g.
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severity of the harassing behavior, presence of witnesses) are held constant, hostile
environment sexual harassment cases heard under reasonable woman standard will be
more likely to result in decisions that favor the plaintiff than cases that are not heard
under this standard.
The researchers found only a weak relationship between legal standard and court
decision in actual legal cases. The results suggested that hostile environment sexual
harassment cases that operated under a reasonable women standard were somewhat more
likely to be decided for the plaintiff than cases that did not operate under a reasonable
women standard. The article suggested looking at judge gender and legal standard (it also
implied that there were not enough female judges who hear cases involving sexual
harassment), investigating the use of alternatives to the reasonableness standards that
have been proposed (e.g. respectful person standard) in an effort to understand their
potential impact on court decisions, and adapting the fact pattern methodology used in
experimental studies to samples of actual judges to get a fuller understanding of how a
variety of factors jointly influence the judicial decision making process (Perry et al.,
2004).
The Supreme Court enacted sexual harassment laws under Title VII in 1964, since
that time, the courts have established articulated and altered the field of sexual
harassment law. The legal standard of reasonableness, which is used by the courts to
determine liability in sexual harassment cases, has particularly been a source of question
among the legal community.
This current study intends to pursue Perry et al's (2004) suggestion to, "explore
the use of alternative reasonableness standards by comparing the reasonable woman
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standard to the reasonable person and reasonable worker standard." (Perry et al, 2004, p.
22)
The purpose of this study is to determine if the participants who applied the
reasonable woman standard, as compared with those using the gender-neutral reasonable
person or worker standard, would be more likely to take the complainant's perspective.
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the more the jurors discuss the definitions of
reasonable the more likely they will be to find for the plaintiff when the wording is
"reasonable woman" as opposed to "worker or person."
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CHAPTER II
Methodology
Participants
The sample consisted of 157 participants randomly divided into one of three
groups. Participants were 82 males, and 74 females. One participant did not list their
gender. They encompassed a wide range of ages, races, and socio-economic backgrounds.
The participants age ranged from 16 to 90, (mean age- 22.74 years).
Participants reported a wide variety of work experience including; 79 (47.4%)
participants who worked in retail or food service industries, 13 (7.8%) participants who
worked as police officers, lifeguards, or security, 18(10.8%) who reported employment as
office workers, 13 (7.8%) teachers, aides, or counselors, 2 (3%) participants who reported
being self-employed, 13 (7.8%) tradesmen, 3 (1.8%) theater workers, 1(.6%) poker
dealer, 1(.6%) person who reported being retired, 4 (2.4%) environmental workers, and
10 (6%) who did not respond.
Participants' responses as to how long they have been employed ranged from 0 to
35 years with a mean of 2 years and 3 months. Six of the 157 participants reported that
they have served on a jury in the past.
Participants were recruited from either Rowan University's undergraduate
psychology classes or Atlantic Cape Community College's student enrollment. Rowan
students were required to sign up to participate in research in order to meet the class
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requirements. Atlantic Cape Community College students were recruited by professors
who volunteered the students to participate as a class. All Atlantic Cape Community
College students were informed that they did not have to participate and not participating
would not be held against them. All participants were given an informed consent form to
sign (See appendix H for full documentation.).
Neither the colleges, nor the professors, nor the students were offered any
incentive to participate, although students were given class credit by their professors.
Materials
Each participant was given a written sample of a sexual harassment compliant
entitled, Mary (Plaintiff)v. XCompany and Joe (Defendant) (See Appendix E for full
documentation.). Each participant also received a written explanation of the judge's
instructions. The judge's instructions were taken from the New Jersey jury instructions,
Specific primafacie burden to be included in general charge; section G. Sexual
harassment;hostile environment (11/99). The instructions explained legal standards that
must be met in order for the jury to decide in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant.
Included with the judge's instructions was definition of the reasonable standard,
unwelcome, and hostile work environment (See Appendix F for full documentation.).
After reading the case and the judge's instruction, participants answered a survey that
asked questions regarding the participant's individual decision regarding the case, a form
to record the mock jury's decision as a whole, and a repeat survey of the individual's
decision regarding the case.
A Sony® Micro cassette-Recorder M-470 was used to record each mock jury
group while they discussed the case and determined the verdict. Jury groups ranged from
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2 to 12 members each. (M = 6.5)
Design and Procedure
Instructions were given to each mock jury explaining that they were to read the
case, the judge's instructions, and then complete the first survey individually. This was
followed by each jury being audio recorded while discussing the case and unanimously
deciding whether Joe and Company X where either liable or not liable. After the mock
jury had a verdict each participant was asked to finish the next questionnaire individually.
In order to control for acquiescence by the participants, they were not told what the
purpose of the test was until the entire sample group had completed the surveys and
returned the surveys to the researcher. Each participant was given a debriefing before they
were dismissed from the classroom (See Appendix I for full documentation.).
The packet given to each participant included a questionnaire that asked
demographic questions, such as gender, age, year of school, major, work experience and
whether the participant had ever served jury duty in the past.
The surveys were designed with Likert scales to measure the participants'
responses. The participants were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with each
statement listed in the survey. The five-level Likert scale asked the participants to circle
either; strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, or strongly agree; with 1 for strongly
disagree and 5 for strongly agree. This scale was used for all of the jury decision
questions with the exception of the question regarding severity which was scored with a 1
to 10 rating (1 less severe; 10 More severe). Participants were asked to respond to
statements about the case, such as, "There was a hostile work environment," or "The
conduct was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable worker believe that the

19

conditions of employment were altered and the working environment was intimidating,
hostile, or abusive. (See Appendix for full documentation.).
All testing sites were college classrooms. In all trials the researcher used the same
standard procedure administering the instructions and surveys. The same researcher gave
the instructions to every mock jury. Each jury was given as much time as needed for the
jury to agree to a unanimous decision.
Participants were randomly divided into 24 mock juries with sizes ranging from 2
to 11. (M = 6.5) Participants were divided into mock juries that had three different sets of
reasonable standard. The groups consisted of 7 juries who were asked to determine
liability based on the reasonable woman standard, 8 juries who decided the case using the
reasonable person standard and 9 juries who used the reasonable worker standard. All
instructions were identical except for the words (reasonable person, reasonable woman, or
reasonable worker). Three sets of instructions were presented to groups with definitions
of reasonable person, reasonable worker or reasonable woman (See Appendix G for full
document.). The groups were told to read the sexual harassment compliant and to arrive
at a decision in 20 minutes. Participants would individually fill out a questionnaire about
the case prior to making their decision and again after the decision is made.
All groups were told that they would be audio tape recorded as they attempted to
reach a verdict. To check whether the participants had a firm grasp of the meaning of the
reasonable standard the recordings were then analyzed to determine to what extent the
participants discussed the "reasonable person, woman, or worker" standard and what
impact the standard had on their final decision.
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CHAPTER III
Results
It was hypothesized that participants, who apply the reasonable woman standard,
as compared with those using the person or worker standard, would be more likely to take
the complainant's perspective. There was a significant difference between woman,2(4,
N

=

49)

=

62.066,p <.01, person,

x2

(4, N = 55) = 68.15,p <.01, and worker standards, x2

(4, N = 53) = 37.90, p <.01, and pre- (M = 2.43) and post (M = 2.47) responses for point

of view. Participants were asked, if they had judged the case from the point of view of
the plaintiff, an objective observer, or both the plaintiff and an objective observer. Posttest scores of 145 (92.4%) of the participants in this study found that they judged this case
from either the plaintiffs view or the plaintiffs and an objective observer's view. Posttest scores of 12 (7.6%) participants claimed to have judged the case from the plaintiffs
point of view. Post-test scores of 59 (37.6%) of the participants claim to have judged the
case from an objective observer's point of view in determining liability. Post-test scores
of 86 (54.8%) of the participants claimed to have judged the case from both the plaintiff's
and an objective observer's point of view (See Appendix A for figure 1.). The data
collected partially supports the hypothesis that individual participants, who apply the
reasonable woman standard as compared with those using the gender-neutral reasonable
person or worker standard, would be more likely to take the complainant's perspective. In
the current study, participants used the point of view of the plaintiff and an objective
observer more in the post test than in the pretest.
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Those participants who reported a score of 5 (strongly agree) to the statement, "I
have personally experienced sexual harassment in the work place." judged the
defendant's conduct to be more severe (M = 6.97; on a ten point scale) than those
participants who reported a score of 1 (strongly disagree) to the statement, "I have
personally experienced sexual harassment in the work place (M= 5.94)." Analysis of
total scores of participants who reported that they had not experienced sexual harassment
in the workplace to participants who reported that they had experienced sexual
harassment in the workplace using a pair-wise comparison shows that the difference is
approaching significance with those who said they had experienced sexual harassment
saying the environment was more severe (M = 3.98) (See Appendix B for figure 2.). F (4,
126)=.590, p=.058
There was a marginally significant interaction between judgments of hostile work
environment and those who had experienced sexual harassment in the workplace.
Participants who had reported that they had experienced sexual harassment in the
workplace (M

=

4.22) judged the case as more hostile than those who had not done so

(See Appendix C for figure 3.). F (1,127)= 2.57, p = .04
Participants who reported that they disagreed with the statement, "I have
personally experienced sexual harassment in the workplace," reported that they found the
defendant's behavior to be more unwelcome on the post test than they had reported on the

pretest. F (4,127) - 1.36, p - .052 Also, individual participants who reported that they
agreed with the above statement reported that they found the defendant's behavior to be
more unwelcome after they have met with other jury members and discussed the case.

Their pre- and post-test scores were significantly different. F (4,127)
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-

1.36, p

-

.039

Descriptive statistics show that 59.2% (posttest) of the participants agreed that the
defendant's actions created a hostile work environment, while 26.1% (posttest) of the
participants strongly agreed that the defendant's actions created hostile work
environment. Most of the participants also agreed (57.3% posttest) or strongly agreed
(26.1% posttest) that the defendant's conduct was unwelcome by the plaintiff.
Participants agreed (51.6% posttest) or strongly agreed (26.1% posttest) the harassment
was due to the plaintiffs sex.
Nineteen mock juries decided that the defendant, Joe, and Company X were liable
and 5 mock juries decided that the defendant, Joe, and Company X were not liable. A
cross-tabulation ofjuries assigned to each standard determined significant differences in
judgments of liable and not liable for the reasonable woman standard, the reasonable
person standard and the reasonable worker standard; woman, x2 (1, N= 49) = 9.01, p
=.012, person,

2(1, N = 54)- 17.04,p <.01, worker,x 2 (1,N=53)-29.03,p<.01,(See

Appendix D for figure 4.).
It was believed that participants assigned to the reasonable woman standard (as
compared to the reasonable person or worker standard) would lower their thresholds and
therefore be less affected by individual-difference factors. The data collected does
partially support the hypothesis that the participants assigned to the reasonable woman
standard would lower their thresholds and therefore be less affected by individualdifference factors. There was a significant difference between the mock juries using the

reasonable woman standard (M - 4.57), the mock juries using the reasonable person
standard (M-= 2.13), and the mock juries using the reasonable worker standard (M-= .78).
The mean reported above represents the number of times each jury mentioned the word
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hostile. The woman group mentioned "hostile" significantly more than either the person
or worker groups F (2, 23) = 3.33, p = .055. Tukey isp < .045 between woman and

worker.
There was no significant difference between juries for mentioning the words
unwelcome, whether the behavior of the defendant constitutes sexual harassment,
whether the plaintiff's work conditions were altered, and whether or not the participants
found the defendant's behavior to be severe and pervasive.
It was hypothesized that the more the jurors discuss the definitions of reasonable
the more likely they would be to find for the plaintiff when the wording is reasonable
woman as opposed to worker or person. The findings show that participants in all three
groups did not mention the term reasonable often (M

=

1.13). The participants instead

discussed the term hostile more frequently (M = 2.33). F (2, 23) -3.33, p =.055
Therefore, the data does not support the third, and final, hypothesis that more the
jurors discuss the definitions of reasonable the more likely they would be to find for the
plaintiff when the wording is reasonable woman as opposed to worker or person.
Participants in the reasonable woman jury used the words hostile work
environment more than in the reasonable worker jury. Participants in the reasonable
woman jury also mentioned the reasonable standard the most times even though overall
there was only a marginal significant difference between juries.
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CHAPTER IV
Discussion
Strong arguments have been made for the support or rejection of a reasonable
woman standard. Prior research (Baird, 1995) pointed out that since, over-all, women
rated scenarios in the work environment as more harassing than men it may be unfair to
use a reasonable person standard, an average of men's and women's interpretations of
harassment.
The case of Ellison v. Brady which was used in this research set precedent for the
use of the reasonable woman standard in many states; however, the data analyzed in this
research did not show a difference in outcome when comparing the outcome of
defendant's liability (yes, no) between the three groups (woman, person, or worker).
This research suggests that jury members are more likely to focus on whether the
defendant's actions created a hostile work environment rather than whether the plaintiff s
inability to perform his or her job under the stated conditions was reasonable.
Based on the findings of this research it seems more likely that the juror's past
personal experiences with sexual harassment in the workplace are more of a contributing
factor to the juror's final decision. Jurors may be determining liability based on their
interpretation of the definition of hostile work environment, which is one of the criteria
for determining sexual harassment, rather than the definition of the reasonable standard
used in the judge's instructions.
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Prior research pointed out that woman jurors rated scenarios in the work
environment as more harassing than men jurors (Baird et al., 1995). This may also be true
for participants who have personally experienced sexual harassment prior to sitting on a
jury. The data collected in this study shows the interaction between those who reported
and did not report being a victim of sexual harassment, and then, judgment of severity is
approaching a significant difference.
Participants who reported that they disagreed with the statement, "I have
personally experienced sexual harassment in the workplace," reported that they found the
defendant's behavior to be more unwelcome on the post test. Also, individual participants
who reported that they agreed with the above statement reported that they found the
defendant's behavior to be more unwelcome after they have met with other jury members
and discussed the case. The results suggest that all jurors tend to find the defendant's
behavior as perceived as unwelcome by the plaintiff after discussing the case with other
jury members.
However, when severity of the case was discussed by the juries, individual jury
members who had experienced sexual harassment in the work place were more likely to
find the case to be more severe than those jury members who had not had personal
experience with sexual harassment. Based on the data, the participant's individual
experiences with sexual harassment seem to be affecting the outcome of the individual's
decisions. This should be investigated by future researchers. As mentioned above, prior
research has shown a difference between males and females as to how each gender rates
scenarios in the work environment as harassing (Baird et al., 1995). This current research
has established that individuals with prior personal experience with sexual harassment in
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the workplace also tend to deem the defendant's behavior as more severe. Future research
should focus on differences between male and female jury members who report that they
have had personal experience with sexual harassment and how that experience affects
jury decisions.
Prior research has suggested that when other variables (e.g. severity of the
harassing behavior, presence of witnesses) are held constant, hostile environment sexual
harassment cases heard under reasonable woman standard will be more likely to result in
decisions that favor the plaintiff than cases that are not heard under this standard (Perry et
al., 2004). In this study, the prior involvement in sexual harassment cases by the
participants was not accounted for before the research was conducted. In the current
study, the fact that individuals who report having personally experienced sexual
harassment in the work place deem the defendant's behavior to be more severe and
hostile than other jury members is an important finding.
This study used a convenience sample comprised of college students from two
institutions of higher learning. The majority of the participants were under the age of 21.
One hundred and twelve (71.3%) of the participants were between the ages of 18 and 21.
Due to the high percentage of participants who are in their late teens to early twenties it is
highly unlikely that the results of the study can be generalized to the U.S. population
which represents the true jury pool.
Another limitation that may have affected the outcome of this research is possible
misinterpretation of the jury instructions or definitions by the participants. In one
particular jury, one of the male participants convinced the other jurors that a liable verdict
against the defendant would result in the defendant being placed on Megan's Law and
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would ultimately force the defendant to register as a sex offender. The jurors were not
instructed to discuss the ramifications of the verdict and this juror may have
unintentionally hampered the results. In another group, a female is heard on the audiotape
asking if the defendant is reasonable. Again, this leads the researcher to the assumption
that at least one participant was not able to understand the judge's instructions and
definitions needed to decide the case.
This research supports a marginally significant difference between the reasonable
woman group and reasonable workers juries. Reasonable woman juries tended to use the
term hostile work environment significantly more often than the reasonable workers
group. No significant differences were found among the woman, person or worker groups
in terms of saying the words unwelcome, severe, pervasive, if the case constituent sexual
harassment or in determining liability. There was a significant difference between woman
and worker when participants were asked individually to determine if the defendant's
action created a hostile work environment. Individual participants in the reasonable
woman group had higher scores for hostile work environment than the reasonable worker
group. Participants in the reasonable woman group also mentioned the reasonable
standard the most times even though overall there was only a marginal significant
difference between juries which partially supports the original hypothesis.
This researcher proposes that future research on the effects of the reasonable
standard on jury decisions consider the flaws of this study and rework future research
accordingly. Emphasis should be placed on testing the participant's level of
understanding in regards to the legal definitions used in the judge's instructions. Future
research might include pre-jury selection testing, which is designed to test each potential
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participant's ability to understand legal terms and concepts.
Future research should also be conducted that includes the independent variables
reasonable woman, reasonable person, and reasonable worker, but limits the dependent
variable to only include liability. In this study, including variables, such as hostile work
environment, may have distracted the participants' attention away from the reasonable
standard. The other variables are supposed to be the standard by which they make their
decision. Based on this research that may not always be the case, since some mock juries
in this research determined the case on only specific legal wording and did not take into
account all of the standards. Often cases in this study were decided (according to the
audio tapes) based on one or two legal standards alone. Groups were recorded who never
mentioned the term reasonable, hostile, and severe. Groups varied in their discussions.
Some groups did not discuss the case at all among themselves evidenced by their audio
times of 45 seconds to decide the case, while other groups took as long as 20 minutes to
discuss the legal standards that were given in the judge's instructions for the jury. Based
on the findings it is possible that several of the participants did not understand the legal
definitions that required comprehension in order to determine liability. Several examples
of statements made by participants were mentioned earlier, (e.g., one participant
convinced jurors that a liable verdict would result in the defendant being placed on
Megan's Law and a female is heard asking if the defendant is reasonable) that suggest not
all participants were able to understand the judge's instructions. Future research might
consider testing if the participant's knowledge of the legal definitions is accurate before
having them participate as a jury member.
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APPENDIX A
Figure 1. Point of View Participants Used to Determine Liability
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APPENDIX B
Figure 2. The Interaction of Judgments of Severity and Whether the Participant
Experienced Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
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APPENDIX C

Figure 3. Pre- and Post Test Scores For an Interaction Between Hostile (Y) and
Experienced Sexual Harassment (X)
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APPENDIX D
Figure 4. Mock Jury Verdicts
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APPENDIX E
Example of the Sexual Harassment Case Decided By Mock Juries
Please carefully read the following sexual harassment compliant described by the
plaintiff.
Mary (Plaintiff)v. X Company and Joe (Defendant)
Mary worked as an agent for a large company. During training she met Joe,
another trainee. The two co-workers never became friends, and they didn't work closely
together. At this company agents often went to lunch in groups. When no one else was in
the office, Joe asked Mary to lunch. She accepted. Mary claimed that after the lunch Joe
started to pester her and hang around her desk. Four months later, Joe asked Mary out for
a drink. She declined, but she suggested that they have lunch the following week. She did
not want to have lunch alone with him, and she tried to stay away from the office during
lunch time. One day, during the following week, Joe uncharacteristically dressed in a
three-piece suit and asked Mary out for lunch. Again, she did not accept.
Two weeks later, Joe handed Mary a note, which read: "I cried over you last night
and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such constant turmoil. Thank you for
talking with me. I could not stand to feel your hatred for another day." When Mary
realized that Joe wrote the note, she became shocked and frightened and left the room.
Joe followed her into the hallway and demanded that she talk to him, but she left the
building. Mary later showed the note to a supervisor. The supervisor said that "this is
sexual harassment." Mary asked the supervisor not to do anything about it. She wanted to
try to handle it herself. Mary asked a male co-worker to talk to Joe and to tell him that she
was not interested in him and to leave her alone. The next day, Joe called in sick.
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Mary did not work on Friday, and on the following Monday, she started four
weeks of training in another town. Joe mailed Mary a card and a typed, single-spaced,
three-page letter, in which Joe wrote, in part: "I know that you are worth knowing with or
without sex...Leaving aside the hassles and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you
so much over these past few months. Watching you. Experiencing you from

0 so far

away. Admiring your style...Don't you think it odd that two people who have never even
talked together, alone, are striking off such intense sparks...! will write another letter in
the near future." Explaining her reaction, Mary stated: "I just thought he was crazy. I
thought he was nuts. I didn't know what he would do next. I was frightened."
Joe was transferred by the company but after six months requested to be
transferred back. The transfer was granted with the stipulation that Joe did not attempt to
contact Mary. Mary first learned of Joe's request in a letter from her supervisor. The letter
indicated that management decided to resolve Mary's problem with Joe with a six-month
separation, and that it would take additional action if the problem recurred.
After receiving the company's letter, Mary was "frantic." She filed a formal complaint
with the company. She also obtained permission to transfer temporarily when Joe
returned. Joe wrote Mary another letter, which still sought to maintain the idea that he and
Mary had some type of relationship.
Mary contacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and filed a
sexual harassment lawsuit against Joe and the company claiming, "hostile work
environment."
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APPENDIX F
Example of the Judge's Instructions to Jury
Sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct that enters into employment decisions and/or
conduct that unreasonably interferes with an individual's work performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
In "hostile work environment" complaints, the work environment must become so
offensive as to adversely affect an employee's job performance.
A hallmark of a sexual harassment claim is that the advances are unwelcome.
"Unwelcome" means that the worker did not invite or solicit the advances. This is
determined by an objective standard and not the claimant's subjective feelings. On the
other hand, even voluntary participation in sexual activity does not mean that the
advances were not unwelcome. One factor to consider is whether the worker indicated
that the advances were unwelcome notwithstanding consent.
Hostile work environment amounts to unlawful sex discrimination even in the absence of
the loss of a job benefit. Hostile work environment harassment does not require an impact
on an economic benefit. It can involve coworkers, third parties, or supervisors. It is not
limited to sexual advances; it can include hostile or offensive behavior based on the
worker's sex. It can occur even when the conduct is not directed at the claimant but still
impacts on his or her ability to perform the job. It typically involves a series of incidents
rather than one incident (although a single offensive incident may constitute a hostile
work environment.
Three criteria must be met in a claim of harassment based on a hostile work environment:
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1. The conduct was unwelcome.
2. The conduct was severe, pervasive, and regarded by the claimant as so hostile
or offensive as to alter his or her conditions of employment.
3. The conduct was such that a reasonable worker would find it hostile or
offensive.
To decide plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment, you must decide three issues:
1. You must determine whether plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the
evidence (more than 50% in the plaintiffs favor) that the alleged conduct actually
occurred.
2. If you find that some or all of the alleged conduct occurred, you must decide
whether the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence (more than 50% in
the plaintiffs favor) that the conduct constitutes sexual harassment. This requires that
you decide:
(a) whether the conduct occurred because of plaintiffs sex, and if so, (b)
whether the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable worker believe
that the conditions of employment were altered and the working environment was
intimidating, hostile or abusive.

Definition of Reasonable Worker - In deciding whether the conduct in this case is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile working environment, you must view
the conduct from the perspective of a "reasonable worker," not from plaintiffs own
subjective perspective. In other words, the issue you must decide is not whether plaintiff
personally believed that their working environment was hostile. The issue you must
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decide is whether a reasonable worker would find the working environment hostile. Thus,
if only an overly-sensitive worker would view the conduct as sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile working environment, but a reasonable worker would not, it
is not harassing conduct for which the plaintiff can recover. By the same token, even if
plaintiff personally did not find the alleged conduct to be severe or pervasive, but a
reasonable worker would, it is harassing conduct for which the plaintiff can recover. You
must use your own judgment in deciding whether a reasonable worker would consider the
working environment hostile.
If, after applying these guidelines, you find that the plaintiff has not proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment,
then you must return a verdict for the defendants on the plaintiffs claim of sexual
harassment. If, on the other hand, you find that plaintiff has proven that the conduct
constitutes sexual harassment, then you must return a verdict for the plaintiff.
In summary, you must decide whether plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the conduct constitutes sexual harassment. This requires that you decide
1.

whether the conduct occurred because of the plaintiff's sex, and if so,

2.

whether the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable
worker believe that the conditions of employment were altered and the
working environment was intimidating, hostile, or abusive.
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APPENDIX G
Example of Individual Survey Given to Participants
Answer these questions after readingthe case and the Judges
Instructions.
1. The defendant should be found liable for sexual harassment in this case.
Yes

No

2. How severe did you find the behavior in this case to be?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

8

10

More severe

Less severe

Respond to the following statements about the case: SD

= strongly disagree, D-

disagree, N = neutral,
A = agree, SA

-

strongly agree

3. There was a hostile work environment.
SD

D

N

A

SA

4. The conduct was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable worker
believe that the conditions of employment were altered and the working
environment was intimidating, hostile, or abusive.
SD

D

N

A

SA

5. The conduct occurred because of the plaintiff's sex
SD

D

N

A

SA

6. Ijudged this case from the point of view of the:
__________the

plaintiff

_________an objective observer
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both the plaintiff and an objective observer

STOP HERE; When you are ready the researcher will push record on the tape
recorded and you can discuss the case with the other jury members. Decide the
case as a jury. You must have a unanimous decision. You have 20 minutes to
discuss. When you have arrived at a decision, turn the page.
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Answer this question for the entire jury after the jury's discussion.
Jury's decision. The defendant should be found liable for sexual harassment in
this case.
Yes
No
Stop here. Do not turn the page until the group has indicated its' decision.
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After the group has indicated its' decision, answer the following questions with
your own opinion at the present time. Do not refer to your previous answers or
follow jury member's opinions, but give only your personal current opinion.
1. The defendant should be found liable for sexual harassment in this case.
Yes

No

2. How severe did you find the behavior in this case to be?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Less severe

9

10

More severe

Respond to the following statements about the case: SD = strongly disagree, D =
disagree, N = neutral,
A = agree, SA = strongly agree

3. There was a hostile work environment.
SD

D

N

A

SA

4. The conduct was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable worker
believe that the conditions of employment were altered and the working
environment was intimidating, hostile, or abusive.
SD

D

N

A

SA

5. The conduct occurred because of the plaintiff's sex.
SD

D

N

A

SA

6. ! based my decision on how ! would have reacted to the events described in the
case summary.
SD D
N

A

SA

7. I judged this case from the point of view of the:
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the plaintiff

an objective observer
both the plaintiff and an objective observer
8. I have personally experienced what I believed to constitute sexual harassment
at my work place.
SD

D

N

A

SA

9. I have personally been involved in a sexual harassment case.
SD

D

N

A

SA

10. I felt pressured by the other jury members to go against my personal verdict in
this case.
SD

D

N

A

SA

Answer the following questions about yourself.
Gender
M
F
Age

Year in School
Freshman

Sophomore
Junior

Senior

Graduate Student

Major
Work Experience
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Type of

Job(s)

How long have you been employed in this field?
Months
Have you ever served on a jury?
Yes

No
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Years

APPENDIX H
Example of Consent Form
Informed Consent Form
I agree to participate in a study entitled, "The Effect of Jury Instructions on a
Sexual Harassment Case" which is being conducted by Karen Matsinger of the
Psychology Department, Rowan University. The purpose of this study is to examine the
factors that enter into legal decisions in sexual harassment cases. The data from this study
will be submitted for presentation at a research conference and will be submitted for
publication in a research journal.
I understand that I will be required to read a summary of a sexual harassment case,
read jury instructions, discuss the case with other participants, arrive at a decision, and
answer questions about the case. My participation in the study should not exceed one
hour. I understand that my responses will be anonymous and that all the data gathered
will be confidential. I agree that any information obtained from this study may be used in
any way thought best for publication or education provided that I am in no way identified
and my name is not used.
I understand that there are no physical or psychological risks involved in this
study, and that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without penalty.
I understand that my participation does not imply employment with the state of
New Jersey, Rowan University, the principal investigator, or any other facilitator.
If I have any questions or problems concerning my participation in this study I
may contact Karen Matsinger at karenmatsinger~yahoo.com or (609)-884-61 72) or Dr.
Eleanor Gaer at (856)-256-4872.
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Dr. Eleanor Gaer
(Professor's Name)

(Signature of Participant)

(Date)

(Signature of Investigator)

(Date)
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APPENDIX I
Example of Debriefing Form Given to Participants After the Completed the Survey
Study Debriefing
This study is concerned with the comparison of three different versions of the reasonable
standard (person, worker, and woman) and the effect each statement has on the outcome
of the jury's verdict in a hostile environment sexual harassment lawsuit. Previous studies
have found that, over-all, women rated scenarios in the work environment as more
harassing than men (and both men and women viewed behavior by male perpetrators as
more likely to qualify as harassment), therefore, it may be unfair to use a "reasonable
person" standard, an average of men's and women's interpretation of harassment.
Why is this important to study?
Since the Supreme Court enactment of sexual harassment laws under Title VII in 1964,
the courts have established, articulated ad altered the field of sexual harassment law. The
legal standard of "reasonableness," which is used by the courts to determine liability in
sexual harassment cases has particularly been a source of question among the legal
community.
Strong arguments have been made for the support or rejection of a "reasonable
women" standard. This study intends to explore the use of alternative reasonableness
standards by comparing the reasonable women standard to the reasonable person and
reasonable worker standard.
What if I want to know more?
If you would like to receive a report of this research when it is completed (or a summary
of the findings), please contact Karen Matsinger at 609-884-6172 or
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karenmatsinger.yahoo.com.
If you have concerns about your rights as a participant in this research, please contact
Professor Gaer at gaer~rowan.edu.

Thank you again for your participation.
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